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The effect of boilerplate language on
nonprofessional investors’ judgments
OZLEM ARIKAN *
Aston Business School, Accounting Department, Aston University, Birmingham, UK
Most companies disclose risk factors using vague, boilerplate language. Regulators are
concerned that this vagueness reduces the decision-usefulness of the information; hence,
they are encouraging companies to be more specific rather than generic. However, little is
known about the impact of specificity on investment judgments. The results of this
experimental study suggest that regulators’ concern may be justified. Non-professional
investors who read a generic disclosure react less strongly immediately after reading it than
those who read a more specific disclosure when prior information about the disclosed risk
factor is available in their memory immediately before reading the risk disclosure. In
addition, on realisation of the risk, they are more surprised than their counterparts who read
a more specific disclosure, and lower their credibility judgments accordingly. These
investors correct their judgments after the risk realisation to a greater extent than those who
have read a more specific disclosure. The study has implications for regulators, managers,
non-professional investors and researchers.
Keywords: risk disclosures; non-professional investors; specificity; investor judgment and
decision making; experimental accounting
1. Introduction
The style of information conveyed by companies’ risk disclosures varies. For example, in their
2009 annual reports, Yahoo (2009) specifically named Google, Microsoft, AOL and Facebook as
its main competitors, whereas Google (2009) broadly stated its competitors to be general-
purpose search engines, social networking sites, and providers of online products and services.
However, Yahoo has since started to use less specific language, and although some companies,
such as Booking Holdings Inc., owner of booking.com, are still using more specific language
(Booking Holdings 2020), generic language is increasingly being used in risk disclosures.
More specific risk disclosures are those that explicitly state the nature of risks that are particular
to a company by identifying precise facts or circumstances as prevalent sources of risk, while less
specific disclosures are those that do not tailor the identified sources of risk to the company, but
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
*Email: o.arikan@aston.ac.uk; ozlemasmaarikan@gmail.com
Paper accepted by Frank Hartmann.
Accounting and Business Research, 2021
https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2021.1922990
rather disclose more general facts and circumstances that may be common to other companies as
sources of risk.
Regulators seem to be concerned about the use of generic information in risk disclosures. For
example, the UK’s Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has sought to encourage disclosure of
risks specific to the entity rather than common to the industry or all businesses (FRC 2011a),
yet after nearly a decade it reports that boilerplate disclosures remain a problem in corporate
reporting (FRC 2019). Use of boilerplate information is also seen as problematic elsewhere,
including the USA (SEC 2019a,b, Deloitte 2013). Using an experimental methodology, this
study attempts to understand the effect of specificity on non-professional investors’ judgments,
and validate regulators’ concerns about the decision-usefulness of boilerplate risk disclosures.
Previous accounting research on risk disclosures has focused on the determinants, content and
usefulness of risk disclosures. Studies have found that size is an important determinant, as larger
companies issue greater risk disclosures (Linsley and Shrives 2006), and that most risk disclosures
contain narrative rather than quantitative content (Dobler 2008). Accounting research also reveals
that managers make strategic choices about their disclosures (see Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2011,
Hogan et al. 2017). For example, Dobler (2008) suggests that managers are not incentivised to
provide verifiable risk information. Other studies find that many risk disclosures lack useful
firm-specific details (Kravet and Muslu 2013, Bao and Datta 2014), and that managers try to mini-
mise disclosure of negative information (Yang and Liu 2017).
Nevertheless, risk disclosures are generally found to be useful to investors. In a European
setting, Bozzolan et al. (2009) find that the quantity of forward-looking risk disclosures is posi-
tively related to forecast accuracy, while Dia and Zéghal (2008) find that measures of risk drawn
from risk disclosures in Canada are reasonable proxies for traditional financial and accounting
measures. The usefulness of risk disclosures is also confirmed in US settings (Kravet and
Muslu 2013, Campbell et al. 2014, Hope et al. 2016).
In summary, accounting research finds that narrative risk disclosures, which account for the
bulk of disclosures, are useful to investors but have some limitations. Companies vary in the
extent to which they provide risk information and how they provide it, stemming from factors
such as size, corporate governance and managerial incentives. Regulators’ concern that risk dis-
closures are too generic arises particularly from the fact that this may decrease the decision-use-
fulness of the information (FRC 2018). Previous research confirms the overall lack of firm-
specific details in risk disclosures. However, little is known about how specific language
impacts on investors’ judgments and decisions, and in which contexts, if any. Hope et al.
(2016) examine the market’s reaction to the specificity of risk disclosures, but their focus is
on the absolute value of returns, and they make no directional predictions on how investors
react to specific risk disclosures.
In seeking to fill this gap, this paper explores, in an experimental setting, some possible
implications of companies choosing to be more or less specific in their risk disclosures.
Drawing on the literature on cognition and perception in the general field of psychology, this
study examines the effect of specificity on non-professional investors’ directional judgments,
such as whether or not it decreases their likelihood of investing, risk perceptions and credibility
perceptions, and its interaction with previous knowledge of the risk factor, as well as the extent to
which these investors are surprised by the realisation of the risk. The paper addresses these
research questions through the lens of theoretical constructs such as vividness and signalling,
and finds that the higher level of vividness attributable to specific rather than generic disclosures
impacts on how the specificity of a disclosure influences non-professional investors’ judgments
and decision making. Although previous psychological studies have examined the effects of
vivid information in a wide variety of contexts, their results are mixed, providing no clear evi-
dence that vivid information impacts on investors’ judgments (Hales et al. 2011).
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Specificity is different from, yet related to, vividness. The specificity of a risk disclosure
refers to the extent to which managers explicitly choose to state precisely the nature of risks
particular to their companies. Explicitness and precision make specific disclosures more
vivid than their counterparts, so vividness is a quality of specific information, although not
all vivid information is more specific. For example, Hales et al. (2011) manipulate the vivid-
ness of information in news flashes without manipulating its specificity, to examine the validity
of a concern that vividness may exacerbate swings in investor sentiment during bull and bear
markets. In focusing on the style of risk disclosures over which management has discretion,
this paper complements Hales et al. (2011) by suggesting how managerial choices impact
on investors’ judgments, and how these choices in turn influence the decision-usefulness of
information.
Hales et al. (2011) find that vivid information impacts on investors’ judgments only when the
underlying information is preference-inconsistent rather than preference-consistent. The current
research complements their study by examining another condition affecting non-professional
investors’ judgments, namely whether or not they have any general information about the risk
factor prior to reading the disclosure. Examining this condition is important, since if a risk
factor is known to the market because of its macroeconomic implications, popularity or impor-
tance, investors are likely to have some knowledge of the risk before reading the disclosure.
This study also examines the impact of the specificity of risk disclosures on credibility judg-
ments. This is an important issue because previous literature suggests that management credi-
bility benefits companies by eliciting stronger reactions to management announcements, and
by decreasing companies’ cost of equity (see Jennings 1987, Hirst et al. 2007). The popular
press also suggests that companies benefit from having credible managers. For example,
Forbes cites management credibility as one of the most important factors considered by potential
investors, based on a survey of 321 institutional investors (Kelley 2013).
This study reveals that less specific disclosures significantly increase non-professional inves-
tors’ likelihood of investing before a risk is realised only when they have some prior general
information about the disclosed risk factor. Furthermore, once the risk has been realised, non-
professional investors who read less specific disclosures are more surprised and perceive man-
agers to be less credible, and subsequently correct their investment and credibility judgments
to a greater extent than those who read more specific disclosures. Examining non-professional
investors’ reactions after the risk realisation is important, as the extent to which they are sur-
prised and correct their judgments provides important insights into the informativeness of risk
disclosures. If investors are well-informed about a risk, they are less likely to be surprised and
correct their earlier judgments when it is realised. Hence the results suggest that boilerplate
risk disclosures are less decision-useful than specific disclosures. Boilerplate language is also
found to have an asymmetric effect on non-professional investors’ credibility judgments:
while it has no significant effect before the risk realisation, it has a significant adverse effect
after the risk realisation.
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 reviews the related literature, Section 3 develops
hypotheses, Section 4 describes the experimental design, Section 5 reports the results, and
Section 6 draws conclusions.
2. Background
2.1. Risk disclosures
This study examines non-professional investors’ reactions to risk disclosures in companies’
filings. In many jurisdictions, risk disclosures are mandated by law or other regulations
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(El-Haj et al. 2020). For example, in the UK, the genesis of risk disclosures goes back to 1993,
when the UK’s Accounting Standards Board (ASB) published a voluntary disclosure frame-
work, the Operating and Financial Review, encouraging directors to discuss and analyse
factors underlying the performance and financial position of their businesses (ASB 1993) to
help readers to assess their likely future performance. The ASB particularly suggested that
this should include principal risks and uncertainties. Interest in risk disclosures intensified fol-
lowing the corporate scandals of the early 2000s (Linsley and Shrives 2005), and The Compa-
nies Act 2006 mandated companies’ disclosure of principal risks and uncertainties in their
annual reports (UK Government 2006).
Current regulations (UK Government 2013) mandate the disclosure of risk information in
strategic reports. The FRC, which provides guidance on how strategic reports should be
written, suggests that disclosures should include entity-specific information and that boilerplate
information is of limited use to shareholders (FRC 2018). It defines specific information as par-
ticular facts or circumstances that may affect or have affected an entity (FRC 2018). It also
suggests that investors find principal risk disclosures most decision-useful when they are specific
to the company, allowing sufficiently detailed identification of risks (FRC 2017). Regulators in
other jurisdictions afford similar importance to specificity. For example, in the US, according to
Regulation S-K (SEC 2005, 2019a), companies should not present risks that might apply to any
issuer or offering, but should explain how a particular risk affects the issuer or the securities
being offered. In addition to principal risk disclosures, many other sections in company filings
also include risk disclosures. For example, notes to financial statements refer to taxes and
legal proceedings.
Two attributes of specific information are evident from the regulators’ definitions above:
specific disclosures should be particular to a company, and should be sufficiently detailed to
differentiate them from information attributable to broader groups of companies. For instance,
in its 2009 annual report, Yahoo specifically identified Facebook as a competitor attracting
more online time and thus increasing its share of online advertising dollars. This information
was specific in naming a competitor and explaining why it posed a risk to Yahoo. In contrast,
Google disclosed general social networking sites as its competitors, and did not explain which
were a risk to Google and why. In other words, it failed to explicitly identify in sufficient
detail the risk factors to which it was vulnerable. Some social networking websites may be a
risk factor for a large number of companies for various reasons, whereas many others may
pose no risk at all.
At the opposite end of the specificity continuum are generic or boilerplate disclosures. In its
Guidance to the Strategic Report, the FRC (2018) used the terms ‘generic’ and ‘boilerplate’ as
antonyms of specific disclosures:
Information on how a particular fact or circumstance might affect, or has affected, the development,
performance, position or future prospects of the entity and how it is responding to that fact or circum-
stance provides insightful information that can be used in the assessment of the entity’s future pro-
spects. The inclusion of generic or ‘boilerplate’ information on its own is of limited use to
shareholders.
Similarly, in proposing assessments of current risk disclosures, the SEC (2019b) suggests that
boilerplate risk disclosures are those that might apply to any offering or registrant, using the
terms ‘generic’ and ‘boilerplate’ risk disclosures as the opposite of specific disclosures.
However, despite regulators’ concerns, many companies discuss very generic risk factors
(Johnson 2010, Nelson and Pritchard 2016).
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2.2. Factors affecting risk perceptions based on specificity levels of risk disclosures
Fischoff et al. (1993) posit that how risk is communicated is important because peoplemaybemisled
by inaccurate risk perceptions. Based on the psychology literature, I argue that two factors relating to
the level of risk disclosure specificity affect investors’ judgments: vividness and signalling.
2.2.1. Vividness
One of the most important determinants of reactions to possible future outcomes is the vividness
with which those outcomes are described or represented mentally (Damasio 1994). Nisbett and
Ross (1980) define vividness as (a) emotionally interesting, (b) concrete and imagery-provoking,
and (c) proximate in a sensory, temporal or spatial way. By giving explicit details particular to a
company, specific information makes the images inherent in these details readily available to
readers, making them more vivid.
Several studies suggest that vividness impacts on individuals’ judgments (for a review, see
Slovic et al. 2004). For example, Johnson et al. (1993) find that people are willing to pay
more for airline travel insurance covering death from terrorist acts (a highly imaginable event)
than death from all possible causes, which would implicitly subsume terrorist acts amongst
the range of causes but would not bring fear-provoking mental images to mind. The results of
previous psychological studies are mixed, providing no clear evidence that vivid information
impacts on individuals’ judgments (Hales et al. 2011), although experimental studies in account-
ing suggest that, under certain circumstances, vividness (Hales et al. 2011) or its components
(Sedor 2002, Riley et al. 2014, Elliott et al. 2015) may do so.
2.2.2. Signalling
Research on semiotics has examined how choosing a particular format of language when other
formats are available reflects the speaker’s ‘active plan’ to communicate desired impressions to
recipients of the message (see Sebeok 2001, Von Uexküll 1982). Previous accounting research
indeed suggests that variations in the placement or descriptive content of information may
signal its meaning or significance to decision makers (Koonce and Mercer 2005). Nelson and
Pritchard (2016) find that under a voluntary disclosure regime, firms subject to greater litigation
risk use less boilerplate information in their risk disclosures. Kasznik and Lev (1995) examine
management disclosures and investors’ reactions to them in the face of an earnings surprise,
and find that the bigger the earnings disappointment, the more concrete the warnings. They
also find that firms tend to warn only of permanent earnings disappointments, and that the com-
bined reaction to the warning and the subsequent earnings announcement is significantly more
negative for firms that have warned investors than for firms that have not. A suggested expla-
nation for these findings is that when a firm issues a warning, investors receive a signal that
the earnings disappointment is permanent. Thus, in the styles they choose for their disclosures,
managers appear to provide signals to investors, and investors appear to understand those signals.
3. Hypotheses
3.1 Effect of specificity on investment judgments
I argue that more specific risk disclosures are more vivid than less specific ones. Since more
specific risk disclosures often give real-world examples with more explicit and concrete
details than less specific disclosures, the former are potentially more interesting, concrete and
image-provoking, and thus more vivid than the latter (Nisbett and Ross 1980).
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Although information disclosed using less specific language may comprise at least the same
information as, and possibly more than, that disclosed using more specific language (just as death
from all possible causes subsumes terrorist attacks as well as other causes), specific information
makes it easier for individuals to imagine what might happen under certain conditions. Infor-
mation similar to that disclosed by Yahoo using more specific language (potential online adver-
tising revenue losses arising from competition with Facebook) was captured in Google’s
disclosure using less specific language (potential revenue losses arising from competition with
social networking sites), but the latter was conveyed much less vividly.
Previous research (Nisbett and Ross 1980) suggests that vividness is the most important
source of the availability heuristic, whereby people predict the probability of an event based
on how easily an example can be brought to mind (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). Thus, the
vividness of a more specific risk disclosure is likely to increase the availability of information,
which will, in turn, increase the perceived seriousness of the risk factor, and thus decrease the
likelihood of investment in the company.
Hales et al. (2011) argue that vivid information affects investors’ judgments more than pallid
information only when investors process the information deeply. Previous market-based research
suggests that risk disclosures are taken seriously by investors (Kravet and Muslu 2013, Campbell
et al. 2014, Hope et al. 2016); therefore, I expect investors’ decisions to be impacted by the speci-
ficity of risk disclosures.
Kasznik and Lev (1995) find that managers use more concrete information in their warnings
when the risk is more serious, and that investors appear to understand such signals. Based on this
previous research, I contend that investors may believe that a manager disclosing more specific
information signals that the disclosed risk is an important one for the company. However, extant
research does not yet appear to provide direct evidence that investors’ signalling perceptions
depend on the specificity of narrative risk disclosures.
In summary, I predict investors to be less likely to invest in a company because they perceive
a risk to be more serious when the information is disclosed using more specific rather than less
specific language. Thus, my first hypothesis is:
H1: Non-professional investors who read more specific risk disclosures are less likely to invest in a
company than those who read less specific risk disclosures.
3.2. Interaction of prior risk knowledge and specificity with investment judgments
Kisielius and Sternthal (1984, 1986) argue that elaboration of information increases the persua-
siveness of vividness, and Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) elaboration likelihood model, in turn,
suggests that the likelihood of elaboration is determined by motivation and ability to evaluate
the information presented. Researchers suggest that prior knowledge not only increases one’s
ability to evaluate information (Petty and Cacioppo 1986, Dochy et al. 1999), but also sparks
further interest in the subject, both of which increase motivation to elaborate on the information
(Tobias 1994).
As discussed for H1 above, vividness is the most important source of the availability heuristic
(Nisbett and Ross 1980). According to Nisbett and Ross (1980), the availability of information is
likely to be enhanced by the numbers of units of information encoding the same conceptual fact
and of sensory pathways storing the information. Similarly, Petty and Cacioppo (1986) argue that
prior knowledge creates a schema about an issue in individuals’minds, which is cognitively bol-
stered when an external communication confirming this schema is presented. Kisielius and
Sternthal (1984, 1986) suggest that the greater the increase that vividness creates in associations
between the message’s content and what is available in memory, the greater the effect of
6 O. Arikan
vividness on individuals’ judgments, thus explaining the link between availability of information
and the effect of vividness on judgments.
In this study, the information that participants read in the prior information condition about
competition being a risk within the industry was aligned with the message they read later in the
risk disclosure. Therefore, they were more likely to elaborate on factors that increase competitive
risk than their counterparts who did not have this prior information, and more elaboration
increases the impact of vividness on judgments. When general risk information about a business
is immediately available in the memory, additional details given in a specific disclosure are more
likely to increase the number of associations between these details and what is already in
memory. Indeed, Begg et al. (1985) find that individuals are more persuaded about new
details on familiar topics than on unfamiliar topics.
Thus, it is likely that when general risk information is already available in investors’memory,
specificity will have a greater impact on their judgments through its vivid characteristics, leading
to my second hypothesis:
H2: The specificity of a risk disclosure has a greater impact on investment likelihood judgments for
non-professional investors who have some prior information about the disclosed risk factor than
those who have none.
Figure 1 presents this prediction in graphical form.
3.3. Implications of less specific versus more specific disclosure after a risk is realised
As I expect investors who receive a less specific risk disclosure to perceive the risk to be lower
than investors who receive a more specific disclosure, I also expect them to be more surprised
when the disclosed risk is later realised.
Schlenker et al. (1994) posit that people are held responsible for an event to the extent that
they seem to be connected with it, especially if they seem to have had personal control over it. In
my study, the event referred to cautioning investors about a risk that had now been realised.
Because managers have personal control over the specificity of disclosures, investors are
likely to hold them responsible for these disclosures. Hence, I expect investors to blame man-
agers who disclose a risk less specifically for communicating it inadequately. Indeed, Libby
and Tan (1999) find that failure to warn impairs management credibility, and Mercer (2005)
finds that immediately after the realisation of bad news, investors respond to less forthcoming
disclosures by worsening their credibility judgments of managers.
Figure 1. Predictions-H1 and H2. This figure presents predictions for the measures used in my experiment
to capture participants’ investment likelihood judgments.
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Previous accounting research also suggests that investors lower their credibility judgments
for less forthcoming managers only when they understand the financial reporting implications
of the disclosure (Krische et al. 2014). If investors who receive less specific disclosures perceive
the risk to be lower before the risk is realised, and are hence more surprised about its realisation,
as previously predicted, they are likely to understand both the financial statement implications of
the risk disclosure and management’s inadequate warning about such implications after the risk
is realised. Therefore, on risk realisation, I expect investors to perceive managers who provide
less specific disclosures as less credible than those providing more specific disclosures.1
In summary, since I expect non-professional investors who receive less specific disclosures to
be more surprised on realisation of the risk, I predict that this will lead to lower credibility judg-
ments for less specific managers. Therefore, my third hypothesis is:
H3: Non-professional investors who read less specific disclosures have lower credibility judgments
of managers after risk realisation than those who read more specific disclosures.
4. Research method
I employed a two-by-two between-subjects experimental design.2 Participants read information
about a hypothetical company and made judgments about their likelihood of investing in the
company, as well as its riskiness and the credibility of its management. My research questions
elicited non-professional investors’ reactions to the specificity of risk disclosures, and how speci-
ficity interacted with having some information about the risk factor prior to reading the disclos-
ure. This experimental methodology allowed me to isolate these effects, which are confounded in
the real world by other factors and disclosures.
4.1. Participants
In this study, 200 participants were recruited as proxies for non-professional investors via Pro-
lific, a UK crowdsourcing site through which individuals are paid to complete academic surveys
or experiments. Five participants did not complete the instrument, and 25 subjects failed one of
the manipulation checks, as discussed in Section 5.1, leaving 170 participants.3 Peer et al. (2017)
compare Prolific and AMT, a similar crowdsourcing site, with more traditional participants and
find both sites to be reliable in terms of the quality of attention and replication of previous results
obtained from more traditional participant populations. Extant accounting research also supports
the use of a crowdsourcing site (AMT), particularly for examining the judgments of less soph-
isticated investors (Rennekamp 2012, Buchheit et al. 2018).
The appropriateness of a particular group of participants depends on whether they have suf-
ficient knowledge for the task (Libby et al. 2002). The task in this study involved judgments and
decision making that required no specific expert knowledge. The dependent variables were not
technical, and participants were asked questions about their likelihood of investing in the
company, their perceptions of the risk, the credibility of management and the extent to which
1I have no hypothesis about the impact of specificity on investors’ credibility judgments before risk realis-
ation, as negative warnings create two counteracting forces (Libby and Tan 1999). On the one hand, man-
agement’s forthcomingness may improve investors’ credibility judgments, while on the other hand, the
increase in the perceived riskiness of the company may decrease investors’ credibility judgments.
2Ethical approval was obtained to use human subjects for the experiment.
3Forty-nine per cent of participants resided in the UK, 32% in the USA and 19% in other countries. Their
current residence had no impact on any of the reported statistical tests.
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they were surprised about the realisation of the risk. The risk disclosures and news articles, which
were the main areas of interest in the design, were written in plain English. The results reveal that
participants had no difficulty in understanding the main manipulation. Therefore, the subject pool
was deemed to be appropriate.4
Nevertheless, since the context is related to a financial disclosure, before seeing the manip-
ulations, participants were given some financial information and background information about
the company. Some expertise may have come into play in this section, as some participants may
have been more financially literate than others. To ensure that the results were not impacted by
such differences, I asked participants a pre-manipulation question about how attractive they
found the company, and controlled its effect whenever this pre-manipulation response impacted
on their later decisions (see Section 4.4). Furthermore, previous business education and invest-
ment experience had no significant effect on any of the dependent variables (all p-values > 0.1,
two-tailed, untabulated). Sixty-nine per cent either had previous investment experience or were
planning to invest in the future.5 In terms of demographics, 45% of participants were female and
55% male, and 61% had a bachelor’s degree or higher.
Previous market-based literature shows that small investors, who are typically non-professional,
are influenced by variations in the language used in 10-Ks (Miller 2010),6 and that risk disclosures
are used by investors and incorporated into their decisions (Kravet and Muslu 2013, Campbell et al.
2014). Importantly, this paper aims to be of relevance to regulators, who are concerned about generic
disclosures (FRC 2018, 2017, 2011a, SEC 2013a) and who take particular account of non-pro-
fessional investors in drafting their regulations (FRC 2011b, SEC 2013b).
4.2. Task
All participants received background information and excerpts from the financial statements of a
hypothetical company, HiddenEscapes Inc., and were asked to assess the company’s overall
attractiveness as an investment. At the beginning of the experiment, some randomly-assigned
participants received an excerpt from an article published in a major business magazine which
suggested intense competition amongst online travel agencies, and answered a question relating
to the article (prior information condition). Other participants did not see this article (no prior
information condition). All participants then received an excerpt from the company’s annual
report about its competition risk.7 Some randomly-assigned participants received a more specific
disclosure, and the rest a less specific risk disclosure.
After reading the risk disclosures, all participants evaluated their likelihood of investing, the
riskiness of the company and the credibility of management. They then answered some demo-
graphic questions, which served as a distraction task and allowed some time to elapse before
the next section of the study (risk realisation). The risk disclosure warned participants that com-
petition might adversely affect the company and impact negatively on its revenues, so the risk
realisation would be an adverse consequence of competition, such as a drop in market share
4An additional quality control measure was to recruit participants who had a previous approval rating of at
least 90%, who would direct appropriate attention to the experimental task.
5These were measured by asking participants whether they had bought or sold a company’s common stock
or debt securities, or planned to do so.
6Form 10-K, an annual report that must be filed by public companies in the US, provides a comprehensive
overview of the company’s business and financial condition, including audited financial statements (SEC
2009a).
7Competition risk is a frequently reported risk factor, but most such disclosures are quite generic, akin to
other risk disclosures (Bao and Datta 2014).
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and subsequent drops in revenues or share prices. Therefore, in the risk realisation stage, partici-
pants read a news item from the financial press about the company’s declining revenues and stock
price due to a substantial loss of market share (risk realisation), following which they re-evalu-
ated their likelihood of investing and management’s credibility. They also indicated how sur-
prised they were by the adverse news.
Next, the participants answered an essay question in which they described any perceived attempts
by management to signal insights beyond the facts given in the risk disclosure. They then answered
some questions regarding the vividness and specificity of the information they had read.
4.3. Independent variables
The predictions were tested using a two-by-two experimental design that manipulated the com-
pany’s risk disclosure (less specific versus more specific), and whether or not participants had
some information about the risk factors prior to reading the risk disclosure (prior information
versus no prior information).
4.3.1. Specificity
Based on random assignment, half the participants received a less specific and the other half a
more specific disclosure. The less specific disclosure broadly identified the parties comprising
the source of competition risk (e.g. online specialist travel agencies) and how they might threaten
the company (e.g. through greater brand recognition). The more specific disclosure explicitly
identified the competitor parties (two hypothetical companies, FarEscapes Inc. and ExclusiveEs-
capes Inc.) and explained how they might threaten the company (e.g. one of the competitors had
started to advertise on TV). The specificity levels in this study were based on real-world
examples of more and less specific disclosures and the vividness literature, and were manipulated
as follows.
Participants in the less specific condition received the following information:
We face intensive competition in every aspect of our business. We currently compete with other
online travel agencies, other travel information providers on the web, and traditional travel agencies
who can reach certain customers more easily. Some of these competitors have more financial
resources than us, and can or are using these resources in a variety of ways to compete with us,
including improving their brand recognition. It is likely that competition risk will adversely affect
us in the future. If that occurs, competition will have a considerably negative impact on our revenues.
Participants in the more specific condition received the following information:
We face intensive competition in every aspect of our business. We currently compete with other
online travel agencies, such as FarEscapes Inc. and ExclusiveEscapes Inc., internet search
engines offering travel itineraries and recommendations, and traditional travel agencies who can
reach elderly customers more easily. Some of these competitors have more financial resources
than us, and can use these resources in a variety of ways to compete with us. For example, one
of our competitors has started to advertise on television. It is likely that competition risk will
adversely affect us in the future. If that occurs, competition will have a considerably negative
impact on our revenues.
Two hypothetical online travel agencies were named as competitors in the more specific con-
dition, whereas in the less specific case, no specific competitor names were given. Therefore,
in the less specific case, it was up to the participants to bring to mind specific competitor
online travel agencies.
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In the less specific case, other travel information providers on the web were identified as a
source of competition, which by definition included internet search engines offering travel itin-
eraries and recommendations, although these were not explicitly mentioned; whereas in the more
specific case, a type of business within that group was explicitly mentioned, namely internet
search engines offering travel itineraries. Therefore, in the more specific case participants
would have been able to call to mind general-purpose internet search engines such as Google
and Bing, as well as specialist search engines such as Kayak and Expedia. On the other hand,
participants in the less specific case would have been able to envisage Google, Kayak,
Expedia, etc. as competitors, but would also have been able to call to mind travel websites pro-
viding reviews, such as TripAdvisor and airline companies, as all these companies provide travel
information on the web.
In the more specific case, elderly customers were explicitly stated as a type of customer that
traditional travel agencies can reach more easily; however, for the less specific group, no explicit
definition was offered, and the participants were simply told that traditional travel agencies can
reach ‘certain customers’ more easily, leaving it to them to imagine who these customers might
be, whether elderly people, business people, other people, or a combination.
Lastly, in the less specific case, participants were told that some competitors were able to use, or
were actually using, their financial resources to improve their brand recognition. The more specific
case gave the example of advertising on television to improve brand recognition, whereas in the
less specific case it was up to the participants to visualise ways of improving brand recognition.
They might imagine TVadvertising, as stated in the more specific condition, as well as radio, inter-
net or newspaper advertising, loyalty programmes, price discounts, or a combination.
Since the less specific case defined the risk in broader terms, it actually suggested more ways
than the more specific case in which competition might be a threat to the company. Therefore, ex
ante the effects of vividness and signalling, there was no reason for participants to view the risk
described in less specific disclosures as less serious than that described in more specific disclos-
ures. See Appendix for more detail on the manipulation of specificity.
4.3.2. Prior knowledge of risk information
Participants in the prior information condition received some information about the industry’s
competition risk by reading an article about the company’s risk disclosure from a major business
magazine. This suggested that online travel agents were facing intense competition:
Online travel agencies are facing intense competition in their business. The internet continues to
strongly influence the world in which we live. This has led to a substantial increase in the number
of companies offering online travel services; consumers now have a lot of options which they can
choose through online travel agents and third-party comparison sites.
The manipulation conveyed general industry risk information, rather than information relating
specifically to the company, because non-professional investors often obtain this type of prior
information from mass media. This approach also allowed company-specific risk information
to be kept constant across the conditions.8 Participants in the no prior information condition
did not receive any information about the competition risk prior to reading the risk disclosure.
8Investors may also receive specific information about a risk factor, such as a competitor’s entry into the
market, before reading risk disclosures. Depending on its prevalence, this information may swamp all
the language effects, as well as creating information differences between participants. Therefore, this
study focused on general rather than specific prior information.
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4.4. Control variable
Investors’ assessments of companies differ because they are subjective judgments. These differ-
ences may stem from many factors that have nothing to do with the manipulations, such as indi-
viduals’ cognition, experiences or expertise in analysing financial information. This
heterogeneity may cause large error variances in ANOVA if it has a significant effect on the vari-
ables (Kutner et al. 2005).
To combat this issue, I included a pre-manipulation measure. After giving the participants
some general information about HiddenEscapes Inc. and its financial statements, but before pro-
viding any of the manipulations, participants were asked to rate ‘How attractive is HiddenEs-
capes Inc. as a potential investment?’ on an 11-point scale ranging from ‘1-Not attractive at
all’ to ‘11-Very attractive’. I performed a bivariate Pearson correlation between participants’
pre- and post-manipulation judgments and identified variables that were significantly correlated
with the pre-manipulation measure.
To control for the effect of the pre-manipulation judgment, I added the pre-manipulation
measure (pre-attractiveness judgments) as a covariate into the model for variables that correlated
significantly with the pre-manipulation measure, and hence used ANCOVA rather than ANOVA
for analyses relating to these variables.
4.4. Dependent variables
The dependent variables used in my analyses before risk realisation were participants’ likelihood
of investing and their assessments of the disclosed risk. The dependent variables after risk realis-
ation were judgments of managers’ credibility and of investment likelihood, differences in these
judgments before and after risk realisation, and the extent to which participants were surprised by
the realisation of the risk.
5. Results
5.1. Manipulation and comprehension checks
Prior knowledge of risk information was actively manipulated in the prior information condition
by giving participants information about the disclosed risk before they read the disclosure. After
reading the information, they answered a question relating to it while they had access to the infor-
mation. This was to ensure that they could call this information to mind while answering ques-
tions about the dependent variables. Asking a question about the information also encouraged
them to pay appropriate attention to it, and served as a check to ensure that they had understood
it. The question read: ‘Please explain in a few words what the article you just read was about.’
The aim was to make participants aware of competition in the industry, which was the subject of
the risk disclosure that they would later read about. Therefore, participants’ answers were coded
as ‘0’ if they did not mention competition and ‘1’ if they did; 73.4% of participants did mention
competition and the rest did not. A t-test revealed that the mean answer was significantly differ-
ent from 0 (p-value < 0.01, two-tailed, untabulated), suggesting that my manipulation had been
successful overall. For robustness, I excluded participants who did not pass this manipulation test
from my analyses.
In order to measure whether specificity had been manipulated successfully, I asked the
participants three questions and conducted an ANOVA, setting specificity judgments as the
dependent variable, and specificity and prior information as the independent variables. All
questions were measured on an 11-point scale. The first question referred to the regulator’s
definition of specificity, being entity-specific (FRC 2018, SEC 2009b). The second measured
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specificity in terms of the extent to which the information explicitly stated the nature of the
risk by identifying the circumstances comprising its source (SEC 2009b, FRC 2018). The
third related to the outcome of being specific: if a disclosure discloses risks that are unique
to the company and is explicit about the nature of the risk by identifying the circumstances
that comprise its source of risk, it is likely to include some details of the risk factor (FRC
2017). Mercer (2005) posits that providing details is a part of forthcomingness. Therefore,
my fourth question was on the extent to which participants found more specific managers
to be more forthcoming.
Participants found the more specific disclosure to be significantly more entity-specific
(mean: 7.17 versus 6.14), explicit (mean: 8.45 versus 7.42) and detailed (mean: 7.07 versus
5.80), and management to be more forthcoming (mean: 8.46 versus 7.97) than participants
in the less specific condition (all p-values for disclosures < 0.01; p-value for management
forthcomingness = 0.09, two-tailed, untabulated), suggesting that the specificity manipulation
was successful.
To measure participants’ comprehension, I asked them three true/false questions to measure
correct detection of a group of competitors, a competitive disadvantage of the company, and one
possible competitive advantage of the competitors. I then took the average of these three com-
prehension questions. The average of correct answers was 93.7% across all participants,
suggesting that they had paid sufficient attention to the disclosures. None of the independent vari-
ables had a significant effect on the number of correct answers, and there were no significant
differences across conditions (p-values > 0.1).
5.2. Hypothesis tests
5.2.1. Judgments before risk realisation
H1 examined whether the specificity of risk disclosures impacts on non-professional investors’
judgments of their likelihood of investing, and H2 examined whether specificity has a stronger
impact on the likelihood of investing when some prior information about the disclosed risk factor
is available in non-professional investors’ memories before reading the risk disclosure. I
measured participants’ likelihood of investing by asking: ‘What is the likelihood you would con-
sider HiddenEscapes Inc. as a potential investment?’
Panel A of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics, Panel B reports the marginal means,
and Panel C reports the results of the ANCOVA using investment likelihood judgments as
the dependent variable, specificity, availability and their interaction as the independent vari-
ables, and participants’ pre-attractiveness judgments as the covariate.9 The results suggest
that the specificity of risk disclosures impacted on participants’ investment judgments (p <
0.01, two-tailed): they were less likely to invest when the disclosure was more specific than
when it was less specific. Furthermore, availability of prior information interacted signifi-
cantly with specificity (p < 0.01, two-tailed). Panel D of Table 1 reports the results of the
simple effects test. Specificity had a significant impact on participants’ judgments of
their likelihood of investing when they had some prior information about the disclosed
risk factor, (p < 0.01, two-tailed), but not when they did not have that information (p =
0.723, two-tailed).
H1 and H2 are built on the assumptions that more specific risk disclosures increase non-pro-
fessional investors’ risk assessments, and that this effect is stronger when some prior information
9As explained in Section 4.4, ANCOVAwas used because the correlation between pre-attractiveness judg-
ments and investment likelihood was significant (p < 0.01).
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is available in their memories. Following previous accounting research (Koonce et al. 2005b), I
measured participants’ overall risk assessments with the question, ‘How serious a risk do you
believe HiddenEscapes Inc. faces from competition?’10
Table 1. Tests for hypotheses H1 and H2.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (dependent variable: likelihood of investing; mean [standard deviation])
Specificity
Prior risk information Less specific More specific Average
Prior information 4.19 [2.07] N = 36 3.21 [2.25] N = 33 3.72 [2.20] N = 69
No prior information 4.82 [2.19] N = 50 4.55 [2.27] N = 51 4.68 [2.23] N = 101
Average 4.56 [2.15] N = 86 4.02 [2.34] N = 84 4.29 [2.26] N = 170
Panel B: Estimated marginal means (mean [standard error])
95% confidence interval
Prior risk information Specificity Lower Upper
Prior information Less specific 4.55 [0.25] 4.07 5.04
More specific 3.24 [0.26] 2.73 3.75
No prior information Less specific 4.50 [0.21] 4.09 4.92
More specific 4.59 [0.21] 4.18 5.00
Panel C: Analysis of covariance
SS Df MS F-stat p-value
Pre-attractiveness 445.328 1 445.328 204.203 <0.01
Prior risk information 17.148 1 17.148 7.863 <0.01
Specificity 15.322 1 15.322 7.026 <0.01
Specificity X prior risk information 20.041 1 20.041 9.190 <0.01
Error 359.834 165 2.181
Panel D: Follow-up simple effects tests
Prior information condition
SS Df MS F-stat p-value
Pre-attractiveness 177.92 1 177.92 88.220 <0.01
Specificity 28.686 1 28.686 14.218 <0.01
Error 133.162 66 2.018
No prior information condition
SS Df MS F-stat p-value
Pre-attractiveness 268.421 1 268.421 116.608 <0.01
Specificity 0.290 1 0.290 0.126 0.723
Error 255.586 98 2.302
Note: The dependent variable is investment likelihood, measured by the question ‘What is the likelihood that you would
consider HiddenEscapes Inc. as a potential investment?’ on an 11-point scale ranging from ‘1-Not at all likely’ to ‘11-
Very likely’; p-values are two-tailed.
10Previous research suggests that the probability and size of the outcome are the most prominent dimensions
of risk (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1968). Therefore, I measured participants’ perceptions of these two factors
separately, and took their arithmetical averages to set up a construct representing these dimensions. A Cron-
bach’s alpha of 0.73 between this construct and participants’ overall risk perceptions confirmed an adequate
level of internal consistency between the two (Nunnally 1978).
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An ANOVA using the risk judgments as the dependent variable, and specificity and prior
information as the independent variables suggested that the specificity of the risk disclosure
impacted on participants’ riskiness judgments (p < 0.01, two-tailed, untabulated): they perceived
more riskiness when the disclosure was more specific (mean = 8.35, untabulated) than when it
was less specific (mean = 7.73, untabulated).11 As in the likelihood of investing judgments, avail-
ability of prior information interacted significantly with specificity (p = 0.08, two-tailed, untabu-
lated). Furthermore, a simple effects test revealed that when participants had some prior
information about the disclosed risk factor, specificity impacted significantly on their risk judg-
ments (p < 0.01, two-tailed, not tabulated), whereas it had no significant effect when they did not
have that information (p = 0.544, two-tailed, not tabulated).
The results reveal that specificity has a significant impact on non-professional investors’
judgments only when they have some prior information about the disclosed risk factor. See
Figure 2 for a graphical depiction of the results.
This result differs somewhat from the predictions depicted in Figure 1. Specificity had no
effect on the participants’ judgments when they had no prior information before reading the dis-
closures – the line in this condition is almost flat. In other words, the significant effect of speci-
ficity is driven solely by the prior information condition. This contrasts with previous evidence
on management’s beliefs about the impact of specificity on investors’ judgments, which suggests
that companies prefer to make less specific rather than more specific disclosures because they are
concerned that the latter will decrease investors’ likelihood of investing (Kasznik and Lev 1995,
Rolfe and Troob 2001). My results suggest that this effect is context-specific and only occurs
when non-professional investors have some prior information about the risk factor before
reading the risk disclosure.
5.2.2. Judgments after risk realisation
The first two hypotheses relate to participants’ judgments before the realisation of the risk, whereas
the last hypothesis focuses on judgments after the risk realisation. As the previous hypotheses pre-
dicted that non-professional investors would react less to generic risk disclosures before the realis-
ation of the risk, I expected participants who had read generic disclosures to be more surprised on
realisation of the risk than those who had read more specific disclosures. This expectation was con-
firmed by an ANCOVA using participants’ surprise rating as the dependent variable, obtained in
response to the question ‘How surprised were you by the news about HiddenEscapes Inc.’s
market share decline?’, specificity and prior information levels as the independent variables, and
pre-manipulation attractiveness as the covariate.12 Untabulated results showed a significant
impact of specificity on the dependent variable in the predicted direction (p < 0.01, two-tailed): par-
ticipants who had received the less specific risk disclosure were significantly more surprised (mean
= 4.24) than those who had received the more specific risk disclosure (mean = 3.15).
H3 predicted that, after a risk has been realised, non-professional investors’ credibility judg-
ments will be lower when management has used less specific information in a disclosure than
when more specific information has been used. Following previous accounting research, I
measured credibility judgments with a composite measure of trustworthiness and competence
(Mercer 2005). Having posed the questions ‘How trustworthy is HiddenEscapes Inc.’s
11As explained in Section 4.4, an ANOVAwas used since the correlation between risk judgments and pre-
attractiveness judgments was not significant (p = 0.227).
12An ANCOVA was used since the correlation between the surprise variable and pre-attractiveness judg-
ments was significant (p < 0.01).
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management?’ and ‘How competent is HiddenEscapes Inc.’s management at providing risk dis-
closures?’, both before and after the risk was realised, I took an arithmetic average of trustworthi-
ness and competence judgments to construct my credibility variable for both before and after the
risk realisation. I conducted an ANCOVA using pre-manipulation attractiveness judgments as the
covariate, the credibility construct after risk realisation as the dependent variable, and availability
of prior information and specificity as the independent variables.13 The results presented in Table
2 support my hypothesis: participants in the more specific risk disclosure condition made signifi-
cantly higher credibility judgments after risk realisation than those in the less specific disclosure
condition (p = 0.07, two-tailed).
Importantly, specificity had no significant impact on the credibility construct before risk
realisation (p = 0.754, two-tailed, untabulated), suggesting that specificity has an asymmetric
effect on non-professional investors’ credibility judgments. Although being less specific has
no significant effect on credibility judgments before risk realisation, it has a significant
adverse effect on judgments after risk realisation.
I expected a lower level of corrections to judgments on risk realisation when non-pro-
fessional investors receive a more decision-useful risk warning than a less decision-useful risk
warning. To investigate the decision-usefulness of the risk disclosures for credibility judgments,
depending on the level of specificity, I analysed whether participants who had read the less
specific disclosures updated their credibility judgments after the risk realisation more than
those who had read the more specific disclosures. I conducted an ANOVA using the difference
between the credibility construct taken before and after the risk realisation as the dependent vari-
able, and specificity and availability as the independent variables.14 The results tabulated in Panel
D of Table 2 suggest that specificity had a significant effect on the decrease in credibility judg-
ments after risk realisation (p = 0.05, two-tailed). Participants who had read the less specific dis-
closure lowered their credibility judgments on risk realisation (mean = 0.78) significantly more
than participants who had read the more specific disclosure (mean = 0.26, untabulated).
Similarly to credibility judgments, to explore the decision-usefulness of more versus less
specific disclosures for investment likelihood judgments, I conducted an ANCOVA using the
difference in investment likelihood judgments before and after risk realisation as the dependent
variable, specificity and availability as the independent variables and pre-attractiveness judg-
ments as the covariate. The results show that specificity had a significant effect on this
measure (p = 0.052, two-tailed, untabulated): the decrease in investment likelihood after risk
Figure 2. Results for H1 and H2. This figure presents the estimated marginal means of the measures used
in my experiment to capture participants’ investment likelihood judgments.
13An ANCOVA was used since the correlation between the credibility construct after risk realisation and
pre-attractiveness judgments was significant (p = 0.01).
14An ANOVAwas used since the correlation between the difference in credibility construct before and after
risk realisation and pre-attractiveness judgments was insignificant (p = 0.464).
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realisation was significantly smaller for participants who had read the specific risk disclosures
(mean = 0.83) than those who had read the generic risk disclosures (mean = 1.34; means untabu-
lated). This suggests that generic risk disclosures are less decision-useful than specific risk dis-
closures for investment likelihood judgments.
The analyses after risk realisation reveal that participants who had read the less specific judg-
ments were more surprised on risk realisation and corrected their investment and credibility judg-
ments significantly more than those who had read the more specific risk disclosures. Moreover,
specificity has an asymmetric effect on non-professional investors’ credibility judgments before
and after the risk realisation. While being less specific has no significant effect on credibility
judgments before risk realisation, it has a significant adverse effect on judgments after risk realis-
ation. As previous accounting research suggests that credibility benefits companies in the long
term (Jennings 1987, Tucker 2007), and that consistent behaviour that serves investors’ interests
Table 2. Test for hypothesis H3.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (dependent variable: credibility construct after risk realisation; mean
[standard error])
Specificity
Prior risk information Less specific More specific Average
Prior information 6.42 [2.03] N = 36 7.44 [2.49] N = 33 6.91 [2.30] N = 69
No prior information 7.35 [2.31] N = 50 7.55 [2.07] N = 51 7.45 [2.18] N = 101
Average 6.96 [2.23] N = 86 7.51 [2.23] N = 84 7.23 [2.24] N = 170
Panel B: Estimated marginal means (mean [standard error])
95% confidence interval
Prior risk information Specificity Lower Upper
Prior information Less specific 6.50 [0.37] 5.780 7.227
More specific 7.47 [0.38] 6.693 8.198
No prior information Less specific 7.27 [0.31] 6.658 7.887
More specific 7.56 [0.31] 6.954 8.165
Panel C: Analysis of covariance
SS Df MS F-stat p-value
Pre-attractiveness 26.066 1 26.066 5.442 0.02
Prior risk information 7.900 1 7.900 1.649 0.20
Specificity 15.461 1 15.461 3.228 0.07
Specificity X prior risk information 4.349 1 4.349 0.908 0.34
Error 790.316 165 4.790
Panel D: Analysis of variance (dependent variable: difference in credibility construct before and after risk
realisation)
SS Df MS F-stat p-value
Prior risk information 3.628 1 3.628 1.174 0.28
Specificity 11.677 1 11.677 3.778 0.05
Specificity X prior risk information 0.693 1 0.693 0.224 0.64
Error 513.148 166 3.091
Note: The credibility construct is the arithmetical average of trustworthiness (‘How trustworthy is HiddenEscapes Inc.’s
management?’) and competence (‘How competent is HiddenEscapes Inc.’s management at providing risk disclosures?’),
both measured on an 11-point scale ranging from ‘1-not trustworthy/competent at all’ to ‘11-very trustworthy/
competent’. The dependent variable for Panels A to C is the credibility construct after risk realisation. The dependent
variable for Panel D is the difference between the credibility construct before and after the risk realisation. P-values
are two-tailed.
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pays off in the long run (Pfarrer et al. 2010), being less specific may have a more adverse effect
on investors’ judgments in the long term.
Although participants lowered their investment likelihood judgments on risk realisation more
when they read a generic rather than a specific disclosure compared with their judgments before
risk realisation, investment likelihood judgments after risk realisation did not differ significantly
between participants who had read more versus less specific disclosures, despite the significant
positive impact of specificity on their credibility judgments. An ANCOVAwas conducted using
participants’ likelihood of investment judgments after the risk realisation as the dependent vari-
able (measured by the question ‘What is the likelihood you would consider HiddenEscapes Inc.
as a potential investment?’ measured on an 11-point scale from ‘1-Not at all likely’ to ‘11-Very
likely’), specificity and prior information as the independent variables, and participants’ pre-
manipulation attractiveness judgments as the covariate.15 This revealed that specificity does
not have a significant impact on investment likelihood judgments after risk realisation (p =
0.725, two-tailed, untabulated).
This result is in line with the finding of previous research that being forthcoming does not
immediately improve investment judgments, and that judgments focus on the valence of the
news (Kasznik and Lev 1995, Elliott et al. 2011). On reading the news about the risk realisation,
namely a drop in management earnings forecasts as a result of a loss in market share due to com-
petition, participants indeed seemed to focus on the negative news about the earnings in the short
term.
5.4. Additional analysis: vividness, signalling, and mediation
5.4.1. Vividness
Previous psychology literature suggests that vivid disclosures are more interesting, concrete and
easier to imagine than pallid disclosures (Nisbett and Ross 1980). I took several steps to measure
whether participants perceived more specific information to be more vivid. I asked participants
(1a) how easy it was to visualise HiddenEscapes Inc.’s competitors; (1b) how easy it was to visu-
alise how HiddenEscapes Inc. could compete; (2) how concrete was the disclosure; and (3) how
interesting was the disclosure. I conducted an AN(C)OVA series using vividness component
judgments as the dependent variable, and specificity and prior information as the independent
variables.16 All questions were measured on an 11-point scale. The results indicate that the par-
ticipants perceived the more specific disclosures to be more interesting, concrete and easier to
imagine than the less specific disclosures, showing a significant effect of the level of specificity
on vividness judgments (p < 0.04, two-tailed for all components, untabulated).
I conducted a principal component analysis on participants’ vividness judgments, which gave
me a single underlying factor for vividness, explaining 65% of the variance, with an eigenvalue of
2.602. I then ran an ANOVA using the vividness factor as the dependent variable, and specificity
15An ANCOVA was used since the correlation between post-realisation investment likelihood judgments
and pre-attractiveness judgments was significant (p < 0.01).
16ANCOVAwas used when the correlation between a component and pre-attractiveness measure was sig-
nificant; otherwise ANOVA was used (p-values of the correlations untabulated). The questions asked to
measure the dependent variable, with the means for specific and less specific conditions respectively,
were: ‘When you first read the disclosure, how easy was it for you to visualise HiddenEscapes Inc.’s com-
petitiors?’ (8.40 vs. 7.66); ‘How easy was it for you to visualise how HiddenEscapes Inc.’s competitors
could compete with HiddenEscapes Inc.?’ (8.58 vs. 7.84); ‘How abstract or concrete is HiddenEscapes
Inc.’s risk disclosure?’ (7.80.vs. 7.06); and ‘How interesting is HiddenEscapes Inc.’s risk disclosure?’
(7.18 vs. 6.28).
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and prior information as the dependent variables.17 Similarly to the individual measures, specificity
had a significant effect on the vividness factor (p < 0.01, two-tailed, untabulated).
5.4.2. Signalling
Previous accounting research suggests that variations in the placement or description of infor-
mation may signal its meaning or significance to decision makers (Koonce and Mercer 2005).
Indeed, it is suggested that companies typically signal their riskiness through more specific dis-
closures to avoid litigation, and that investors appear to understand these signals (Kasznik and
Lev 1995, Nelson and Pritchard 2016).
To explore whether or not participants perceived any management signalling in my setting, I
measured their signalling perceptions with the following open-ended question:
Some managers try to signal to investors some additional insights about their companies’ future pro-
spects by the language they use in their disclosures beyond the facts given in the risk disclosure. Do
you think HiddenEscapes Inc.’s management tried to signal any additional insights beyond the facts
given in the risk disclosure? If so, what do you think they tried to signal?
I coded the answer as 0 if a participant stated that there was no signalling, and as 1 otherwise. I
then conducted a binary logistic regression, setting the coded signalling opinion as the dependent
variable, and specificity, prior information and their interaction as the independent variables.
Untabulated results showed that none of the variables had an impact on participants’ signal-
ling judgments (all p-values > 0.1, two-tailed), suggesting that the specificity of disclosures had
no impact on participants’ signalling perceptions. However, these results should be interpreted
with a caveat. To ensure that the question did not interfere with the measures used to test the
hypotheses, the measure was taken after the participants had been made aware that the risk
had been realised. The participants may have perceived some management signalling depending
on the specificity of the disclosure before the risk realisation. Indeed, more than 65% of partici-
pants thought that management had signalled something, and many participants under each con-
dition talked in their answers about a drop in the market share, as given in the news pertaining to
the risk realisation (for example, ‘They tried to signal a drop in market share and profits’),
suggesting that news of the realisation brought some noise to this measure.
5.4.3. Mediation
The discussions pertaining to H1 and H2 suggest that specificity has an impact on non-professional
investors’ judgments through vividness and possibly through signalling. The results suggest that
specificity impacted on participants’ vividness judgments, but not on their signalling judgments.
Furthermore, since participants assessed their likelihood of investing in the company after
reading the risk disclosures, one would expect their risk judgments to affect their investment like-
lihood judgments, as suggested in Section 3.1. Overall, my theoretical model and results suggest
that (1) vividness mediates the relationship between specificity and risk perceptions, and (2) risk
perceptions mediate the relationship between vividness and investment likelihood judgments.
Following extant accounting literature (e.g. Rennekamp 2012, Farrell et al. 2017), I con-
ducted the mediation analyses mentioned above using the bootstrapping method developed by
17An ANOVA was used since the correlation between the vividness factor and pre-attractiveness was not
significant (p = 0.283).
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Preacher and Hayes (2008). Bootstrapping generates a sampling distribution of the indirect effect
(of the independent variable on the dependent variable through the mediator variable) from re-
samples of the data with a replacement and generates a confidence interval for its value. For each
analysis, I conducted 2,000 iterations and used confidence intervals at a 90% significance level;
the lack of 0 in an interval suggests significance at that level or above.
My first analysis measured the indirect effect of specificity on risk perceptions via vividness
(specificity and risk judgments mediated by vividness). The independent variable was specificity,
the dependent variable was participants’ overall risk perceptions, and the mediator was vividness
judgments measured as the vividness factor underlying participants’ perceptions of the individ-
ual vividness components, as explained in Section 5.4.1. Availability of prior information, its
interaction with specificity, and pre-attractiveness judgments were the covariates used in the
analysis. The analysis generated a confidence interval of 0.123–0.520. A significant p-value
(< 0.01) suggested that vividness mediated the relationship between specificity and risk
judgments.
My second analysis measured the indirect effect of vividness on investment likelihood judg-
ments via risk perceptions (vividness and investment likelihood judgments mediated by risk per-
ceptions). The independent variable was vividness judgments, the dependent variable was
participants’ judgments of their likelihood of investing in the company, and the mediator was
overall risk perceptions. Specificity, availability of prior information, their interactions, and
pre-attractiveness judgments were the covariates in the analysis. The analysis generated a con-
fidence interval of −0.219 – −0.059. A significant p-value (< 0.01) suggested that risk percep-
tions mediated the relationship between vividness and investment likelihood judgments.
6. Conclusions
More specific disclosures are those that explicitly state the nature of risks by identifying the
parties or circumstances comprising the source of risk, whereas less specific risk disclosures
do not explicitly identify the source of risk. The generic nature of risk disclosures has long
been of concern to regulators. This paper has examined the possible implications for companies
of choosing to make more or less specific risk disclosures in the context of non-professional
investors’ decision making.
The study reveals that more specific disclosures significantly increase non-professional
investors’ risk perceptions and decrease their likelihood of investing only when they have
some prior information about the disclosed risk factors before reading the risk disclosures,
and that specificity has no impact on their credibility judgments of managers at this point.
However, once a risk is realised, non-professional investors who read less specific disclosures
lower their judgments of credibility and likelihood of investing more than those who read
more specific disclosures, and are more surprised by realisation of the risk. These results
suggest that less specific risk disclosures are less decision-useful to non-professional investors
than more specific disclosures.
As far as I am aware, this study provides the first evidence that boilerplate disclosures are less
decision-useful than more specific ones. Regulators have long been concerned about this, and my
results from a non-professional investor context suggest that their concern is justified. My study
is also relevant to managers and non-professional investors, as it shows some adverse conse-
quences of providing and reading boilerplate disclosures.
The results speak to Hope et al.’s (2016) finding that investors react more strongly to more
specific disclosures, but do not make any directional inferences. On the one hand, Hope et al.
(2016) concur that more specific risk disclosures may impact negatively on returns through
how they change investors’ perceptions. On the other hand, they argue that the precision of
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the more specific disclosures may decrease the cost of equity. My study complements Hope et al.
(2016) by providing some evidence in relation to both arguments: specific risk disclosures, at
least in certain contexts, increase non-professional investors’ risk perceptions at the time that
they read them, but improve management credibility after realisation of the disclosed risk,
which in turn has a negative impact on cost of equity (Jennings 1987).
The results may be of interest to regulators, since they suggest that more guidance may be
needed from regulators to help companies make their risk disclosures more decision-useful.
Indeed, extant research finds that the decision-usefulness of financial information has been dete-
riorating (Lev 2018).
Previous research suggests that managers generally provide risk disclosures lacking firm-
specific details (e.g. Kravet and Muslu 2013) and try to minimise disclosures of negative infor-
mation (Yang and Liu 2017). Therefore, decisions to issue generic risk disclosures may result
from management’s expectation of adverse investor reactions to specific disclosures.
However, research on ‘scripted’ or planned decision making underlines that although scripted
decision making is an efficient tool reflecting the likely outcomes of a decision from the perspec-
tive of the decision maker, it does not always lead to appropriate decisions because it may fail to
take account of fine yet important details (Gioia and Poole 1984). Indeed, this study suggests that
although, in some contexts, generic risk disclosures lead to lower risk perceptions than their
specific counterparts, they have an adverse asymmetric effect on non-professional investors’
credibility perceptions. Being less specific does not impact on the extent to which non-pro-
fessional investors perceive managers to be credible before a risk is realised, but does have a sig-
nificant adverse effect on credibility judgments after a risk is realised. Hence, the results of this
study should be of interest to managers.
The results suggest that non-professional investors may react less strongly to a less specific
disclosure than to a more specific disclosure. Differential inferences in decisions based on the
format of information may hinder investors’ ability to make informed decisions if their infer-
ences are incorrect (Koonce et al. 2005a). Therefore, investor education programmes might
focus on the impact of specificity on non-professional investors’ inferences, and aim to encou-
rage them to reflect on and critique their inferences.
As with any experimental research, this study has limitations. The experimental materials did
not fully represent what would normally be available when investors make decisions, as asking
participants to evaluate a greater volume of material would have required more time than could
realistically be requested.
As is typical of experimental designs, to maximise the strength of the relationship between
cause and effect, an artificial environment was created that isolated many other potentially
important factors that were not the focus of this study but are confounded in natural environ-
ments. Hence, there should be no expectation that the results will be replicated every time a
non-professional investor reads a risk disclosure, because in natural environments additional
information competes for investors’ attention. The specificity of risk disclosures is one of
these influential factors that impact on investors’ decision making, and its effect on ultimate
investment judgments or decisions may be weaker in natural environments where other compet-
ing factors are simultaneously present. However, studying one of these factors in isolation con-
tributes to our understanding of how non-professional investors make decisions, as investment
decisions are driven by a combination of factors.
In experiments, participants’ attention is inevitably steered toward what is being examined,
such as risk disclosures as in this study. Therefore, evidence suggesting that these disclosures
impact on investors’ judgments in natural environments where such attention steering is
absent is important. Previous studies of risk disclosures in natural environments (e.g. Kravet
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and Muslu 2013, Campbell et al. 2014, Hope et al. 2016) all confirm that these disclosures influ-
ence investment judgments, corroborating the importance of the focus in this study.
To avoid asking too many questions and distracting the participants, signalling perceptions
were measured in this study with a single question after all other measures, including partici-
pants’ reactions to the risk realisation, had been collected. The results suggest that participants
anchored on the realisation of the news while answering the question, which brought some
noise to the results. In addition, signalling perceptions are inherently context-dependent
(Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). Future researchers might combat these issues by developing differ-
ent measures to examine the impact of specificity on signalling judgments, and by testing signal-
ling in different contexts, such as in interactive settings where signalling is more prevalent.
Accounting research indicates that credibility is particularly beneficial for companies in the
long term (Jennings 1987, Pfarrer et al. 2010), whereas this paper examines the impact of speci-
ficity on non-professional investors’ judgments in the short term. Future research might examine
if and how being consistently specific impacts on judgments in the long run.
Both anecdotal evidence and previous studies suggest that although managers tend to avoid
specific risk disclosures, there are exceptions. Therefore, researchers might examine what factors
encourage managers to disclose their risks more specifically. Previous studies have found that
riskier firms provide lengthier risk information (Campbell et al. 2014, Nelson and Pritchard
2016). However, the relationship between company riskiness and the specificity of risk disclos-
ures in a mandatory risk disclosure regime appears to be an as yet unexamined area for future
research.
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Appendix. Information given to participants in the more and less specific conditions
Less specific More specific
We face intense competition in every aspect our
business.
We face intense competition in every aspect of our
business.
We currently compete with (1) other online travel
agencies, (2) other travel information providers
on the web, and traditional travel agencies who
We currently compete with (1) other online travel
agencies, such as FarEscapes Inc. and
ExclusiveEscapes Inc., (2) internet search engines
offering travel itineraries and recommendations,
and traditional travel agencies who
(3) can reach certain customers more easily. Some
of these competitors have more financial
resources than us, and
(3) can reach elderly customers more easily. Some of
these competitors have more financial resources
than us, and
(4) can or are using these resources in a variety of
ways to compete with us, including improving
their brand recognition.
(4) can use these resources in a variety of ways to
compete with us. For example, one of our
competitors has started to advertise on the
television.
It is likely that competition risk will adversely
affect us in the future. If that occurs,
competition would have a considerably
negative impact on our revenues.
It is likely that competition risk will adversely affect
us in the future. If that occurs, competition would
have a considerably negative impact on our
revenues.
Drawing on real-world examples of more and less specific disclosures and the vividness literature, in
(1), I named two specific competitors in the more specific condition, and named none in the less specific
condition (see Frey and Eagly 1993). In (2), for the less specific case I identified other travel information
providers on the web as a source of competition, which by definition included but did not explicitly mention
internet search engines offering travel itineraries and recommendations (see Smith and Schaffer 2000),
whereas for the more specific case, I explicitly mentioned a type of business within that group. In (3),
for the more specific group I explicitly stated the types of customer that traditional travel agencies could
reach more easily, but for the less specific group I did not explicitly describe them (see Frey and Eagly
1993). In (4), for the more specific case I gave a specific example of how one competitor was competing
(see Frey and Eagly 1993), whereas for the less specific case I gave a broad example.
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